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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KAREN LILLIAN LAYTON and
KATHY LAYTON by and through
her guardian ad litem KAREN
LILLIAN LAY'TON,
Plaint£ ff s and Appellants,

vs.

Case No.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation, and DENVER &
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation,

168497

Def end ants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATE.MENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for wrongful death of the plaintiffs' father and husband.
DISPOSITION OF LOvVER COURT
On June 5, 1969, the court granted defendant, Union
Pacific Railroad Company partial summary judgment
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striking plaintiffs' allegation of nl•gligence (paragraphs
8 a, b, c, d, & e. Third Amended Complaint) and on
April 5, 1971, the case wm; tried to the court. Judgment
,vas granted to the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad
Company. The plaintiff appeals from both decisions.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reven;al of the partial summary
judgment which struck plaintiffs' allegations of negligence and seek a new trial as to all the issues of negligence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decedent, Kenneth Layton, was killed January
15, 1965 in the· early morning at his place of employment
at the North Salt Lake Stockyard. At the time of his
death the decedent was unloading pigs with his coworker, Ray Payne, from railroad cars. The train was
unloading three cars at a stop as the engine pushed the
cars northward past the dock. (Ex. 16 P.)
On October 15, 1968, the Supreme Court sustained
the dismissal of the defendant, Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, from this case stating:
"The duty to maintain trackage in this case
does not require a constant removal of straw
which falls from a rallroad car while livestock is
being unloaded. In fact, it is difficult to see how
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thL• D(•nver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company could constantly keep the ground free from
falling straw without interfering with the unloading operation by the deceased and his fellow employees. It is equally difficult to see how the
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
could foresee that the deceased would slip and
fall from the dock and thus be upon the ground
at all, since his work was confined to the dock
area. The Denver & Rio Grande Wes tern Railroad Company thus owed him no duty to keep
thP track free from straw and ice and had no
reasonable time or opportunity to do so."
A most unusual ruling for an appellate court when
not one whit of evidence had been received in the· lower
nor in the appellate court.
The defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company
then filed its motion for partial summary judgment
alleging it was entitled to the same ruling that the Denver & Rio Grande \V es tern Railroad Company had obtained in the Supreme Court. The lower court granted
its motion and this court denied a petition for an Interlocutory Appeal.

POINTS OF ARGUMENT
1. The lmver court erred in granting partial summary judgnwnt striking plaintiffs' allegations of negligenct>.
2. rrhe court l'l'l'l'd in granting judgment no cause
of action at trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE.

(a) The facts of this ca1:;c were in, dispute.

Many of the facts of this case have always been
in dispute. Any alleged unanimity has resulted solely
from a fiction used by the Court to justify its conclusion.
First of all, how many days, weeks, or months had the
straw, manure, and debris been allo·wed to accumulate
along side the dock? Had the Denver & Hio Grande
Western Railroad Com1mny ever cleaned the tracks?
Had the Union Pacific Ra1lroad ever complained or requested the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company to clean the track'? Did the Union Pacific
Railroad Company clean the track
P. 187 L. 11 L. 24 P. 189 L. 7 - L. 15.
The court's ruling prevented the dl'fendants from
presenting witnesses whose i-iOle purpose would be to
testify concerning the extraneous material along the
track and the length of time it accumulated. As a result
only a smattering of the eYidence is contained in this
record. An examination of nearly any of the exhibits
(photographs) will show litter and debris around the
track and yard.
Second: Could the railroad foresee that the deceased
would ever be on the ground? Not only conld they foresee, they knew or should have known that it was common
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pradirl' to be on the trac:k bed; that the workmen chased
pig8 up and down the bed at least once a week. P. 80
L. 18 - L. 25, P. 103 L. 25 to P104 L. 25, P. 53 L. 5 and
l'. 196 L. 20 to L. 30.
(b) The defendants, Union Pacific Railroad Com-

pany and De nvcr & Rio Grande Western· Railroad Company were not in the smne position as to the law wnd

fa.cts.

'rlw defendants, e nion Pacific Railroad Company
and Denver & Rio Grande -VY es tern Railroad Company,
are not in the same position.

For the Union Pacific Hailroad to make the statement that they were necessitates distortion of the facts.
The Union Pacific Railroad Company was at the scene.
It was moving its own equipment with its own men, and
had opportunity to see first hand the conditions that
existed, had the opportunity to correct any defect, issue
warnings and had the control and authority to stop the
operation until a hazard was remedied. The Union
Pacific Railroad could have been adjudged responsible
under the last clear chance doctrine or under the the
theory of Res Ipsa Loquitur. On the other hand, it
would be very difficult to construe the facts to put the
same burden on the Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad.
(c) Forcing the 1Jlai11tiffs

tu trial with muy hidf

of their allegations prcji'1diccd them and actually preH1ded them frrnn having their day in court.
U HP of sununary jndgment as a Yehicle to dispose
of caHCti shonld he rn::>e<l only in limited circumstances
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where there is no genuim• issue as to any material fact
and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(d) The court fciiled to conip.Zy ywith Rule 56 (d)
of Utah Rules of Ci11il Procdure.

Rule 56 ( d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
certain directions and requirements when a partial summary judgment is utilized ...
"shall if practicable ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy including the extent to which the
amount of damages or othPr relief is not in controversy, and directing such further pro,ceedings
in the action as are just . . . "
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AT TRIAL.

(a) The court was wnablc to see plai1z,tiffs' cause of
action in proper perspective.

The decision of this court not to allow an interlocutory appeal on the striking of the issues of negligence
forced the court to try one-half of the case. Not only
was this prejudicial in raising the issues of negligence
but it was also prejudicial in that it gave unwarranted
support to defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's
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allegation that it enjoye<l the
position as the Denyer & Rio Urande \Vestern Railroad Company. This
conpk<l \\-itlt tlw opinion of the court dated October 15,
H)G8, dismissing the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad and concluding that:
"Und<-'l' the admitted facts of this case the
plainbffa eannot state a valid claim against the
DenVl'l' & Rio Grande Wes tern Railroad."
This opinion implies that the plaintiffs agree or
admit to the conclusions therein because, "the facts of
this case are not in di::-:;pute" and "we, therefore, hold
under the admitted facts of this case."
lt was apparent that the court wrestled with the
problem. P. 255 L. 29 - 2P. 258 L.18.

Line 5 to line 27, Page 25G indicates that the judge
did not know wlwther this court's opinion applied to the
issues of m·gligence raised against the defendant, Union
Pacific Railroad Company, or not.
Being unable to present evidence on the structure
of the dock, and the condition of the trackbed cut out
a substantial part of plaintiffs' case.
The ref nsal of the court to accept the investigating
officer's report in evidence was error. P138 - P139.
(h) The evidence presented docs not sitpport a find-

ing that the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company,
lUU:i free from negligence.

AecidPnt::-:; rarl'ly ''just happen." Plaintiffs presented evickncc "\Yhich clearly shows the negligence of
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the defendant. Had the trial court been free from the
fetters of the partial summary judgment and the opinion
of the Oourt, a different decision would have been forthconung.
In examining the record, plaintiffs submit that the
following illustrations show conclusively the negligence
of the defendant.
At the time the accident occurred the train was
being pushed blindly as far as the men on the loading
dock were concerned. The engineer was unable to see
or did not attempt to see. ( P. 79). The engineer relied
completely on signals from the switchman, Spratt, who
was stationed next to the cupola on the caboose next to
the engine. He was unable to see the men who were working on the dock ( P. 91) and received the signs from the
switchman, Fred Hansen. Fred Hansen could not see
the men on the docks while the train was moving (P. 147
L. 10 - L. 29). The foreman, Joe Terry, was completely
detached from the scene at the time of the accident, as
he was in the administration building. (P. 223). The
fireman, Harley Workman, was on the other side of the
engine away from the accident scene.
Aggravating the blind movement of the train was
the noise of the animals and working men. ( P. 80 L. 1 L. 18, P. 93 L. 17 - L. 22, P. 107 L. 26 - P. 108 L. 3, P. 188
L.19 - L. 22).
There was really only one area of danger on the
unloading operation. This area involved the dock area
where the physical movement of the animals from the
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cars occurrc'd. Ironically enough, this was the only area
o\'l'l' which the defendant failed to maintain control.
llad ::-;omeone been position near the dock the employees
lwen cautioned to stay away from the moving
could
train or a ::;ignal could have been quickly relayed to
stop the train.

a s\vitcl1111an been properly positioned so that
have at least had some direct communication
dock, the death could have
averted. As it
switchman had his back to the scene so that he
mi s:::><'d a signal given by a car inspector, Walter Griffin.
(P. 189 L. 28 - P. 190 L. 10, P. 185 L. 29 - P. 186 L. 3 and
P. 184 L. 15, P. 147 L. 16 - P. 148 L. 10).

Had
he could
with the
wafi, the

rrhe evidence indicates that the switchman Hansen
walkc d about three car lPngths after the next to the last
t:1top before Payne could get his attention. (P. 146 - P.
149). \Valter Griffin, the car inspector, stated on cross
examination that one-half a car had gone by before the
decedent fell. Mr. Kettner mentioned a statement of
Mr. Griffins that indicated he had stated 1}'2 car lengths
went by before Mr. Layton fell. (P. 192 L. 21 - P. 193
L. 15). This means that Mr. Hansen walked from 1}'2
to 2Y2 car lengths after the decedent fell with his back
to tht> warning signal unable to hear the calls of both
Griffin and Payne. Mr. Griffin's testimony varied depending on who was leading him but the testimony of
Hansen appears constant. The engineer's testimony was
that he stopped the train two or three feet after receiving
the signal. ( P. 78 L. 19 - 20) and (P. 82 L. 1 - L. 7).
1
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It was necessary for Payne, after talking with Layton, to run from the loading chute near the track out to
the loading pens before he could get Hansen's attention.
(Ex. 16P. and P. 155 L. 15, and P. 106 L. 28 to P. 107
L. 8).

The light wasn't very good as Hansen was unable to
see the body of Spratt who was on the caboose, one car
north of the engine. (P. 150 L. 10, P. 147 L. 28 - P. 148
L. 6). The function of the foreman was to pass signals
when the switchman couldn't see. (P. 151 L. 30 to P. 153
L. 5).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In summary, the Union Pacific Railroad Company
moved the train without any arrangement or possibility
of protecting the men on the dock. The train crew relaxed
as they were nearly through with the train and it was
cold and damp. '11he switchman turned his back, the
foreman left the scene, and the engineer moved without
being able to see. All this not withstanding, the employees knew, or should have know, there were two inexperienced workers on Dock 2, (P. 99 L. 18-19), that the
noise of the animals, men and train would make it difficult if not impossible to hear, that the dock and the trackbed were covered and littered with snow, debris, straw
and manure. And that the whole operation was a hazard
to men on the dock. (Ex. 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, & 24 ...
photos taken by defendant the day following the accident).
10

Exhibit 2:Jp indicates where Uriffin, the car inalleges Layton fell from the dock. Apparently
1he decPdf·n t 1Yas able to maneuver with the train until
he enconnkred the straw and manure shown by Exhibit
20P.
He was able to keep alive for such period of time
whieh should have given the Union Pacific Railroad
Company time to stop the train.

rnw defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company,
01ved a duty to the dec<'dent to maintain a safe place
for him to work round and about their railroad cars and
npon their trackbed and to warn him of any hazard which
might exist, which it violated. In addition, Safety Regulations and operational rules exist which govern its employees for the safr operation of its equipment.
Safety Regulation 4065 (Ex. 39) P. 250 L. 15 to
P. 252 L. 30 states:
"Before any movPment of cars is made at coal
slrnh•s, f'ngine foreman or conductor must consult
the coal shute foreman or employee in charge and
know there are no persons in or about cars where
they might he injured."
Operating Hule lOG (1£.x. 40) The conductor and
anyone acting as pilot are equally responsible for safety
of train and observance of rules and under conditions
not provided for by the rules, must take every precaution
for protection.
Rule 828 (
40) A trainman must alight from
train at all stops. On passenger trains when practicable

11

the communicating signal system must be used in giving
proceed signal. This must be done by the conductor
when practicable.
Rule 4000 (Bx. 40) ln case of doubt or uncertainty,
the safe course must be taken; in all cases, the safest
available methods must be followed.
Rule 802 (Ex. 40) "Blind shoves must not be made
on any track . . ."
It's difficult for the plaintiffs to believe that the
court really couldn't find any negligent act on the part
of either party. He inherited this case and knowing and
trusting that this court would again look at the matter
held that neither party was negligent. (P. 289).
1

It appears to the plaintiffs that the decedent might
have been negligent as there was little evidence on the
subject. However, plaintiffs contend the principle of last
clear chance would still allow a recovery.
The oft cited case of Teakle v. San Pedro, L.A. &
S.L.R. Co. 3 2Utah 276, 90 P. 402 (1907) appears to contain principles close to the case at hand. An individual
was struck by a backing train and fell under it. He was
not killed but was unable to escape. He lay flat against
the ties to avoid being further injured. The entire train
of cars passed over him until he was struck by the firebox of the engine and killPd. The train operators could
have seen the signals given by the brakeman and others
while the person was under the train, and in time to
have stopped to avoid further injuring him, but they
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wPre inatkntin: and failed to do so and so last clear
dmnce applied.
The fads of this accident differ in some degree
from the Teaklc cmw, hut clearly come within the docof Last
Chance as set out in Section 479 of
the American Law Institute. Restatement of torts.

"'A plaintiff who har:-; negligently subjected
himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's
subsequent negligence may recover for harm
caused thereby, if
preceding the
harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by
the Pxercise of reasonable vigilance and care and,
(b) tlw defendant (1) knows of the plaintiff's
situation and realiz<-'S thP helpless peril involved
theerin; or (II) knows of the plaintiff's situation
and realizes the helpless peril involved therein or,
(III) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thm; had reason to realize the plaintiff's
helpless peril had he exercised the vigilance which
it '''as his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and
( c) thert>after is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."
Cited in B('ckstrorn vs. Williams 82 P.2d 309 3
Utah 2d 210, (1955).

K
vs. Oregon ShortLine Railroad ComfJ<Jn-y,
2P2d 102, 78 Utah 145 (1931), in applying the principle
stated on page 106:
''U ndPr the doctrinP of last clear chance as
announced bY this ·court, the breach of duty toward ono who negligently places himself in the
perilous position may arise before as well as after
the discover:· of the peril. . . . On the other hand,
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if there is a duty to keep a lookout for persons at
the time when, and in the place where, a person
is in a dangerous position, the duty does not cease
merely because the person is in a perilous position because of his own prior negligence."
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE· J. FROST
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake <City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
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